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In this paper, I examine critically the possibilities for implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP) – the principle agreed upon by Member States of the UN to prevent genocide 
and other mass atrocities – in Indonesia given its ongoing culture of impunity for past and 
current grave abuses of human rights.
1
 Essentially I examine two facets of the relationship 
between the Indonesian state and implementing the Responsibility to Protect. After briefly 
outlining the RtoP, I first consider the importance of Indonesia’s support for the principle 
both nationally and within the region and the benefits that Indonesia can derive from its 
support. I then examine the potential for RtoP promotion and implementation at the domestic 
level in Indonesia. In particular, I critique some of the numerous failures of successive 
administrations since the beginning of Reformasi (1998 - ) to fulfil the promises of reform, 
particularly in the area of redressing gross human rights abuses. The main argument of this 
paper is that although the current Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (SBY) administration appears 
one of Southeast Asia’s greatest supporters for the RtoP, the government’s continuing 
unwillingness to redress impunity for grave human rights abuses will undermine current and 
future humanitarian efforts in the region. 
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Tens of millions of Indonesians watched and listened on 21 May 1998 as President 
Suharto announced his resignation, finally bringing to an end his authoritarian ‘New Order’ 
regime (1966-1998). The catalyst for this forced resignation was the Asian economic crisis of 
1997-1998, but it came after widespread internal dissatisfaction with the regime since at least 
the beginning of the 1990s. The New Order’s blatant and extravagant nepotism and 
corruption had caused deep resentment amongst many Indonesians and had tarnished the 
President’s and the regime’s history of economic growth which had resulted in improved 
living standards for millions of Indonesians. Yet, aside from entrenched corruption, the price 
for the New Order’s economic success was the depoliticisation of civil society, the 
militarisation of social and political life, a weak and corrupt judiciary, and an authoritarian 
regime willing to use repression and intermittent displays of state violence to retain power.  
Ten years of Reformasi (the Reform movement, 1998 - ) was marked in 2008 and, 
over the past two years, many Indonesians and Indonesia observers have paused to take stock 
of the changes since the New Order. Dissatisfied with the progress of Reformasi, some have 
looked back at Suharto’s long-lasting, repressive but stable rule with fond memories of years 
of economic growth and improved living conditions.
2
 On the other hand, others (particularly 
the regime’s many victims) remember the New Order as the long, dark night of repression 
with recurrent threats of violence. Yet, despite the many and conflicting views over the 
changes since 1998, as one long-time observer, Greg Barton, remarked, ‘[o]nly a decade ago, 
the Indonesia of today would have represented the best-case scenario that few dared to 
believe possible. Certainly, no one could have predicted that in 2009 Southeast Asia would 
have one successful democratic nation marked by political openness, social stability and 
steady economy growth – and that that nation would be Indonesia.’3 Such praise, for many 
reasons, is well deserved. Looking back at Indonesia’s post-colonial past, at the rise and fall 
of regimes and the violence that marked those regime changes, the reforms of the past decade 
have been impressive. Yet there have also been some failures which undermine the progress 
made and have the potential to impede future reforms. 
The most serious failure of successive Reformasi governments since 1998 has been 
their inability and unwillingness to redress past grave abuses of human rights and to combat 
Indonesia’s continuing culture of impunity. This culture of impunity has, and will continue to 
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have, a seriously negative effect on building the rule of law and the democratisation process 
in Indonesia. It also has a negative effect on the capacity and likelihood of Indonesia to 
implement the Responsibility to Protect and thus prevent future mass atrocities.  
 
The Responsibility to Protect, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia’s Interests 
The Responsibility to Protect (or RtoP) is the principle unanimously agreed upon by 
Member States of the United Nations in 2005 to prevent, react to, and rebuild after mass 
atrocities. In essence, it is comprised of three pillars; first, the responsibility of all states to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity; second, the responsibility of the international community to assist states in 
upholding their obligations; and third, the responsibility of the international community to act 
in a timely and decisive manner to protect populations when a state is manifestly failing to 
uphold its responsibility to protect.
4
 To date, the current Indonesian administration under 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has been a prominent voice within Southeast 
Asia’s supporters of the RtoP.5  
The significance of Indonesia’s support of the RtoP should not be underestimated. In 
the most basic terms of scale, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, the 
largest majority Muslim nation, and is Southeast Asia’s largest economy. In its own right 
therefore, Indonesia should remain of key strategic significance for the principle’s 
implementation. More important, however, is Indonesia’s strong regional significance. 
Indonesia played a crucial part in the founding of the region’s most important and influential 
organisation, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967, and continues to 
be one of the dominant countries in that organisation’s decision-making process.6 Given the 
importance of fostering the principle’s development at the regional level, Indonesia and, more 
importantly, its role within ASEAN, is vital to strengthening the RtoP norms in the Southeast 
Asian region.  
 Indonesia also has much to gain politically from its support of the RtoP. First, it 
affords Indonesia the opportunity to assert its leadership on a topical and generally 
universally-agreed upon principle; that is, the protection of populations from genocide and 
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other mass atrocity crimes.
7
 Particularly since SBY began his first term in 2004, Indonesia 
has shown its desire to raise its profile within international relations. As McIntyre and 
Ramage have argued, ‘Indonesia has shown new international confidence and activism.’8 As 
some public examples of this new international activism during SBY’s first term, Indonesia 
hosted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Bali in December 2007 as well 
as another UN conference on Anti-Corruption in February 2008, both of which raised 
Indonesia’s international profile.  
There are numerous additional reasons that support of the RtoP would be to 
Indonesia’s advantage. Economically, there are several ways in which Indonesia stands to 
benefit. As the emphasis of Pillar Two activities is on international assistance for capacity-
building, Indonesia could gain from initiatives by donor states which help to build its 
capacity to protect. This assistance could take various forms including investment in 
development aid and education as well as programs aimed at RtoP-related areas such as 
strengthening the rule of law, security sector reform or developing mediation capacities. Of 
course, it is facile to argue that Indonesia, or indeed any country, should implement RtoP 
initiatives with the hope of preventing mass atrocities because it stands to benefit 
economically. Economic inducements, be they the long-term economic benefits which derive 
from political stability and peace or potential direct economic stimulus in the form of donor 
aid, however, are further incentives for states such as Indonesia to become involved in RtoP 
programs. 
As a regional leader, Indonesia is also in a position to offer assistance to other 
countries to build their capacities to protect. While this may not directly benefit Indonesia 
economically, it does afford it the chance to increase its profile within the region (and 
perhaps globally) and brings with it the indirect benefits of increasing regional security 
which, in turn, increases Indonesia’s security. We need only look at some of the reasons that 
ASEAN was set up in 1967 to see the potential benefit for Indonesia’s becoming a regional 
RtoP leader. By the early 1960s, there were a number of security threats in Southeast Asia, 
including Sukarno’s ‘Konfrontasi’ with Malaysia and the continuing Indochina wars. When 
ASEAN was founded, it was, in part, based on the desire to create a regional structure that 
would not only promote trade liberalization but also moderate intra-regional conflicts in order 
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to prevent war.
9
 As one of these original purposes of ASEAN was to increase stability in 
order to facilitate regional economic growth, then it is in the interests of both Indonesia and 
the other Southeast Asian nations for Indonesia to promote the RtoP initiatives. After all, 
these initiatives are, ultimately, not only about preventing genocide and other mass atrocities, 
but also about decreasing the likelihood of their occurrence through increasing 
democratization, the rule of law and human rights’ standards. 
There are also numerous advantages for Indonesia (and indeed, for any state) to 
support and implement the RtoP. These advantages are most clearly seen in comparison with 
states which choose to engage in serious crimes and violations relation to the RtoP. The cost 
to states which engage in these violations can be staggering, not only in terms of the cost to 
human lives and welfare, but also to the state’s long-term survival. States which engage in 
these crimes suffer capital flight, the loss of foreign investment and often the reduction of aid 
as well as tourism.
10
 Additionally, the strain placed on resources and the loss of productivity 
as a result of widespread conflicts and/or mass human rights abuses can affect a state’s future 
for many years. Given Indonesia’s unfortunate post-independence history of mass human 
rights abuses, both widespread (the politically motivated massacres of an estimated 500,000 
nation-wide in 1965-1966
11
 is a case in point) and localized (such as in the protracted cases of 
East Timor and Aceh during the New Order period
12
), and the devastating loss of life as a 
result, it is promising that Indonesia has shown such vocal support for the RtoP to date. 
Hopefully, this support for the RtoP at international forums will coalesce into implementation 
over the next few years and into the future. There are, however, significant barriers to 
domestic implementation in Indonesia. 
 
Impunity and Preventing Future Atrocities in Indonesia 
The most serious impediment to strengthening and implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect in Indonesia, and thus to preventing future mass atrocity crimes, is impunity for past 
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grave human rights abuses. The continuing lack of accountability for these atrocities, among 
them a wide range of cases of grave human rights abuses committed before, during and after 
the New Order regime, has created a culture of impunity in Indonesia.
13
 The relationship 
between a culture of impunity and the degree to which this culture undermines efforts for 
building and entrenching the rule of law is clear. Undeniably, in the case of Indonesia, this 
culture of impunity is directly linked to the lack of accountability of the Indonesian military 
in particular, as well as the police and the various non-state militias that have been co-opted 
at different times by the military.
14
 As one observer, Suzannah Linton, put it, Indonesia 
‘provides a textbook example of the direct link between impunity for atrocities going back 
over decades and perpetual cycles of violence.’15 
 Over the years since the end of the New Order, an impressive range of reforms has led 
to the growth of civil society, greater freedom of expression and political participation, free 
and fair elections for the first time since 1955, a gradual depoliticisation of the armed forces 
and numerous other reforms which are evidence of Indonesia’s continuing democratization.16 
When examining the reforms that have been made with regard to the level of protection for 
human rights and accountability for human rights’ violators, however, there is a distinct 
disjuncture between the promise of reform and the reality in Indonesia today. On the one 
hand, particularly within international forums, Indonesia has drastically improved its 
commitment to uphold human rights. It has ratified numerous international human rights’ 
instruments and participated in various UN monitoring activities.
17
 On the other hand, 
however, when it comes to putting these reforms into practice and fulfilling the promises of 
Reformasi of greater accountability for abuses, there have been numerous failures.  
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Of the many incidents of gross human rights’ abuses perpetrated throughout (and at 
the beginning of) the New Order, there are a number of cases which stand out. This study 
briefly highlights the handling of just one case, that of atrocities committed in East Timor in 
1999, as an example of the lack of accountability for grave human rights’ abuses as well as 
the inability and unwillingness of the Indonesian government to bring serious violators to 
justice. 
On 30 August 2009, East Timor (or Timor-Leste) celebrated ten years since the vote 
for independence, a decision that was followed by a bloody reprisal campaign by the 
Indonesian military. Large-scale abuses were perpetrated prior, during and after the vote 
which included massive physical destruction of infrastructure, murder, rape and other crimes 
perpetrated against the civilian population.
18
 As this paper is concerned only with efforts for 
justice within Indonesia itself, it leaves aside the work of the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (A Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e 
Reconciliaçao – CAVR).19  In addition to the CAVR, two other bodies created to deal with 
the atrocities committed in East Timor were the Special Panels for Serious Crimes within the 
Dili District Court and the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) under East Timor’s Prosecutor 
General’s Office.20 Some of the outcomes at the Dili Court included eighty-four convictions 
and four acquittals, however, the remaining 339 suspects, among them former General 
Wiranto (who ran in the Presidential elections in 2004 and 2009), are still in Indonesia (which 
will not cooperate with East Timor’s extradition requests).21  
The handling of cases to prosecute those charged with alleged serious violations 
committed in East Timor by Indonesian courts, however, is where the strongest examples of 
institutionalized impunity can be seen. The East Timor case was the first test of Indonesia’s 
Ad Hoc Human Rights Court which, unfortunately, it failed. To explain how the court came 
about, as well as the great hopes that were invested in its creation, it is necessary to explain 
the background leading up to its creation in 2000. 
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The Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights (hereafter, Komnas HAM – 
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia) is the body in Indonesia most identified with the 
support for human rights. Originally founded in 1993 as a result of international pressure on 
Indonesia to improve its human rights’ record, Komnas HAM’s initial weak mandate was 
strengthened during the early years of Reformasi under Law No. 39 of 1999 (and later 
complemented by Law No. 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Courts). Specifically under these 
new laws, Komnas HAM has the power to carry out investigations to determine whether 
incidents which have occurred constitute violations of human rights. If an initial investigation 
finds that a gross violation of human rights has occurred (e.g. crimes against humanity), 
Komnas HAM then has the power to carry out a further, more extensive ‘pro-justicia’ 
enquiry.
22
 Under Law 26/2000, if Komnas HAM’s pro-justicia enquiry finds that gross 
human rights abuses have in fact occurred, the next step is referral of the case by the 
Commission to the Attorney-General’s Office (AGO) for further investigation, which is the 
only body that can seek prosecutions into these cases. Once the Attorney-General receives the 
case, his office is then supposed to carry out its own inquiry. Throughout the early 2000’s, 
there was some confusion (or, if interpreted more cynically, deliberate recalcitrance on the 
part of the AGO) over which step should be taken next towards prosecutions. The creation of 
an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court to try alleged perpetrators should then be the next step which 
is enacted by the President after a recommendation from the parliament (DPR). So far, out of 
the numerous cases investigated and referred to the AGO, only two have been continued by 
the Attorney-General, namely the East Timor 1999 and Tanjung Priok 1984 cases.  
 Komnas HAM finished its investigations into alleged crimes perpetrated in East 
Timor at the time of the Referendum in 1999. The Commission then made a list of 
recommendations as a result of their inquiry (this was prior to Law 26/2000 being passed), 
only some of which the AGO took up. The AGO finished its own investigation in September 
2000 which was followed in November by the introduction of the Law on Human Rights 
Courts. Shortly afterwards, mainly due to the high level of domestic and international 
pressure to see accountability for the crimes committed in East Timor, the Ad Hoc Human 
Rights Court was set up by the parliament.
23
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 There was hope that this new Ad Hoc Court would usher in a new era of 
accountability for grave human rights abuses. The East Timor trials, however, became a farce 
and have been criticized by a great many human rights’ advocates, international monitors and 
civil society organisations.
24
 A report by the International Center for Transitional Justice 
entitled ‘Intended to Fail’, for example, listed the numerous organizational, structural and 
systemic failures within the Court, but came to the conclusion that ‘[u]ltimately, the failure of 
these trials to meet international standards, and to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of national 
and international observers, rests on the lack of commitment on the part of the Indonesian 
government to encourage or permit a process that could lead to genuine accountability.’25 In 
all, only eighteen of the extensive list of potential defendants given to the AGO by Komnas 
HAM were put on trial, none of whom was a senior military officer identified in the original 
Komnas HAM investigations as responsible for mass atrocities.
26
 In addition, the court 
became an arena for intimidation of judges, prosecutors and witnesses. Large numbers of 
military personnel were almost always present within the courtroom and there was repeated 
harassment of, in particular, judges through threatening midnight phone calls, ‘visits’ and 
other messages.
27
 The end result was a series of show trials put on for the international 
community’s benefit and the acquittal of all of the defendants either at the initial trials or on 
appeal.
28
 
Since the East Timor Ad Hoc trials (and a number of trials in the Tanjung Priok 
incident from 1984), however, the Attorney-General’s Office has failed to pursue cases of 
grave human rights abuses. To date, the Attorney-General has failed to follow the 
recommendations made by Komnas HAM to pursue investigations into at least seven further 
cases of serious crimes.
29
 This refusal by the AGO to pursue these cases through its own 
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investigations and then to the Ad Hoc court constitutes a serious undermining of Komnas 
HAM’s mandate.30 The strengthening of Komnas HAM’s powers in the 1999 and 2000 laws 
was supposed to increase accountability for past and present grave abuses. The lack of 
political will and intimidation by the military shown in the East Timor case which was 
brought to trial as a result of Komnas HAM’s investigations are evidence of the very high 
level of dysfunction between what has been promised by human rights’ reforms and their 
implementation. 
The redress of grave abuses of human rights and overcoming this culture of impunity 
are crucial for Indonesia. Not only is it the right of victims to see those suspected of crimes 
prosecuted and to know the truth about violations, it is the responsibility of the state to take 
all necessary steps to prevent the recurrence of violations. In Indonesia today, ongoing 
impunity for, in particular, security sector personnel seriously undermines any efforts to deter 
or redress what might be speciously termed ‘bad behaviour’ by those in the military and 
police. Manfred Nowak, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, after his initial visit to Indonesia in 2007 came to the 
broad conclusion that ‘given the lack of legal and institutional safeguards and the prevailing 
structural impunity, persons deprived of their liberty are extremely vulnerable to torture and 
ill-treatment.’31 Despite the reforms carried out during the last ten years, there continues to be 
reports of torture, rape and murder by security service personnel across Indonesia, 
particularly against those held in detention and marginalized members of the community such 
as the urban poor, homeless and drug users.
32
  
At the 2008 Universal Periodic Review for Indonesia at the UN Human Rights 
Council, a number of stakeholders who made submissions to the review also highlighted that 
torture was ‘part of police practice’ and that it is ‘regarded by Indonesian security services as 
one of the most effective methods to obtain forced confessions and instill a climate of fear, 
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and is conducted repeatedly and systematically.’33 In terms of preventing atrocities in 
Indonesia, there must be a focus both on the kinds of widespread gross abuses occurring 
within particular areas (i.e. in Papua), as well as on the more banal, ‘everyday’ atrocities 
which occur in police stations and detention facilities across the country on a regular basis.
34
 
 This is an alarming and urgent challenge for preventing future atrocities in Indonesia 
for several reasons. First, this kind of behaviour by the military and police seriously 
undermines public confidence in these institutions. It is fair to say that if people perceive the 
security forces as a threat rather than as a source of protection, then there is little chance of 
building public trust in these institutions, even with reforms in place to help build them into 
professional, impartial and disciplined forces. In addition to this, in an impending emergency 
in which there is a call to prevent mass atrocities, it is often a nation’s security sector which is 
first called upon to stabilize a situation. If the nation’s military and police cannot be trusted to 
prevent rather than perpetrate atrocities against civilians, then they become a liability rather 
than a resource in such a situation. This would seriously hamper a nation’s ability to protect 
its populations, thus necessitating the potential involvement of regional and/or international 
bodies.  
 
Conclusion: No Prevention without Accountability 
The failure by successive Indonesian governments since the beginning of Reformasi to 
address past abuses, and the culture of impunity which exists for past and current abuses are 
perhaps the greatest impediments for lasting reform in the protection of human rights, 
improving the rule of law and, ultimately, the continuation of the democratization process. As 
was noted by several of the organisations which made submissions for the UN 2008 
Universal Periodic Review on Indonesia, this impunity allows for past perpetrators to go 
unpunished which, in turn, ‘encourages’ further human rights abuses by those charged with 
the protection of civilians.
35
 For strengthening and implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
principle in Indonesia, this poses serious, and perhaps insurmountable, challenges. Without 
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accountability for past and present atrocities, Indonesia’s capacity to prevent and respond to 
future mass atrocities is limited. Thus, despite progress in domestic reforms and leadership at 
the regional level on promoting democratization and human rights, unless there is drastic 
action to deal with its culture of impunity for gross abuses, Indonesia will fail to uphold its 
responsibility to protect. 
 
